Equitable allocation of vaccines in a supply network (w/ M. Raghavan). [ssrn]
Widening access in university admissions (w/ A. Erdil). [ssrn]
Market design with deferred acceptance: a recipe for policymaking (w/ K. Imamura and M. B. Yenmez). [arXiv]
A modern design for university admissions in the UK (w/ A. Erdil). [article]
Opinion Pieces: [econobservatory] [HEPI (by R. Cuthbert)] [researchprofessional (by A. Erdil)]
Existence of myopic-farsighted stable sets in matching markets (w/ L. Ehlers). [ssrn]
Extended abstract in EC '23.
Forthcoming and Published Papers
When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (w/ M. B. Yenmez). [ssrn]
Economic Theory, 76, 1145-1173, 2023.
Choice with affirmative action (w/ K. Yildiz). [ssrn]
Management Science, 69, 2284-2296, 2023.
Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism (w/ L. Ehlers). [ssrn]
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14, 556-582, 2022.
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance (w/ L. Ehlers). [ssrn]
Theoretical Economics, 16, 1249-1279, 2021.
On capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules (w/ S. Dogan and K. Yildiz). [ssrn]
Mathematics of Operations Research, 46, 856-868, 2021.
Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints (w/ S. Dogan and K. Yildiz). [arXiv]
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 23, 172-196, 2021.
Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism (w/ M. B. Yenmez). [ssrn]
Economic Theory Bulletin, 8, 125-137, 2020.
Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago (w/ M. B. Yenmez). [ssrn]
Games and Economic Behavior, 118, 366-373, 2019.
Object allocation via immediate acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (w/ B. Klaus). [repec]
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 79, 140-156, 2018.
A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism (w/ S. Dogan and K. Yildiz). [ssrn] [note by H. Aziz]
Journal of Economic Theory, 175, 178-200, 2018.
Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents. [ssrn]
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 73, 103-110, 2017.
Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak (w/ W. J. Cho). [ssrn]
International Journal of Game Theory, 46, 991-1014, 2017.
How to control controlled school choice: comment [ssrn]
American Economic Review, 107, 1362-64, 2017.
Responsive affirmative action in school choice. [ssrn]
Journal of Economic Theory, 165, 69-105, 2016.
Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies. [ssrn]
Games and Economic Behavior, 98, 165-171, 2016.
Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems (w/ W. J. Cho). [ssrn] [online appendix]
Economics Letters, 46, 8-12, 2016.
Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems (w/ K. Yildiz). [ssrn]
Games and Economic Behavior, 95, 47-58, 2016.
Maskin-monotonic scoring rules (w/ S. Koray).
Social Choice and Welfare, 44, 423-432, 2015.
Choice and market design (w/ S. Alva). [arXiv]
Online and Matching-Based Market Design, 2023. F. Echenique, N. Immorlica and V. Vazirani (eds). Cambridge University Press.
Mechanism design approach to school choice: one versus many. [arXiv]
The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design, 2019. In: Laslier JF., Moulin H., Sanver M., Zwicker W. (eds), Springer.