I am a senior lecturer at the University of Bristol since September 2018. My research combines ideas from market design, mechanism design, choice theory, and game theory.
Papers (click research for all papers)
Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism (w/ M. B. Yenmez).
Economic Theory Bulletin, forthcoming.
Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago (w/ M. B. Yenmez).
Games and Economic Behavior, 118, 366-373, 2019.
Object allocation via immediate acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (w/ B. Klaus).
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 79, 140-156, 2018.
A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism (w/ S. Dogan and K. Yildiz)
Journal of Economic Theory, 175, 178-200, 2018.
How to control controlled school choice: comment.
American Economic Review, 107, 1362-64, 2017.
Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak (w/ W. J. Cho).
International Journal of Game Theory, 46, 991-1014, 2017.
Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 73, 103-110, 2017.
Responsive affirmative action in school choice.
Journal of Economic Theory, 165, 69-105, 2016.
Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies.
Games and Economic Behavior, 98, 165-171, 2016.
Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems (w/ W. J. Cho).
Economics Letters, 46, 8-12, 2016.
Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems (w/ K. Yildiz).
Games and Economic Behavior, 95, 47-58, 2016.
Maskin-monotonic scoring rules (w/ S. Koray).
Social Choice and Welfare, 44, 423-432, 2015.
Last Update: September 2019